A fundamental struggle for control simmers within the U.S. Constitution: who truly decides when the nation goes to war? The document itself offers a fractured answer, granting Congress the power to “declare War” alongside assigning the President the role of “Commander in Chief.” This deliberate division of authority was a cornerstone of the founders’ vision, designed to prevent any single branch from wielding unchecked power.
Despite possessing the constitutional authority to declare war, Congress has only done so eleven times, the last declaration aimed at Romania during World War II. However, Congress has repeatedly authorized military action through resolutions, evolving from the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that propelled the U.S. into Vietnam, to more recent “Authorizations for Use of Military Force” (AUMFs) following 9/11 and during the Gulf Wars.
The Vietnam War spurred Congress to attempt a reassertion of its constitutional role with the War Powers Act of 1973. This act aimed to limit the President’s ability to commit troops without congressional approval, requiring notification within 48 hours of deployment and a 60-90 day limit without further authorization. Yet, successive administrations, regardless of party affiliation, have largely resisted recognizing the Act’s constitutionality.
Currently, the Senate is poised to vote on a war powers resolution concerning ongoing conflict. Should it pass the Senate and the House of Representatives, the resolution would, in theory, compel the cessation of hostilities. A simple majority in both chambers is all that’s required for passage, though securing that majority isn’t guaranteed.
Even if Congress were to approve such a resolution, the President retains a powerful check: the veto. Overriding a presidential veto demands a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate – a formidable hurdle. This reality suggests that even a congressional mandate to end a war could be effectively nullified.
Congress possesses another, potentially more potent tool: the power of the purse. Cutting off funding for a military operation can effectively halt it, as demonstrated nearly two decades ago with the Iraq War. However, abruptly ending funding can create dangerous situations for troops in the field, necessitating a carefully managed drawdown.
Just weeks ago, Congress approved the Pentagon’s budget, averting a potential government shutdown. Had they not, a standoff could have emerged, with Democrats potentially refusing to fund operations in Iran without specific restrictions. This dynamic foreshadows a likely intensification of debate surrounding Pentagon funding as the next spending deadline approaches this fall.
Beyond the immediate conflict, the future looms with the potential need for “supplemental” spending bills – emergency funding requests beyond the regular annual budget. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker, has acknowledged the possibility of such a bill for Iran, signaling the need to replenish munitions and arms as they are used.
These supplemental bills, common after 9/11, represent a significant financial commitment. They contributed substantially to the dramatic rise in the national deficit over the past two decades, and their potential recurrence highlights the long-term fiscal implications of ongoing military engagements.
